This report presents the authors collective oplnlons on the value to the nuclear industry of the various investigations performed at TMI-2 by the Instrumentation and Electrical Program. The authors demonstrate that more attention must be given to the prevention of moisture intru510n during design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a nuclear power plant. They also point out that, while basic engineering designs of instruments are more than adequate, the applications engineering and specifications could be improved. Finally~ they show that advanced testing technology, exemplified by the Electrical Circuit Characterization and Diagnostics (ECCAD) System, may be very useful as a diagnostic tool when used as part of the testing or maintenance program in a nuclear power plant.
FOREWORD
This report was prepared by the authors acting as a special committee of the Technical Evaluation Group. The technical evaluation group was comprised of several experts in the fields of instrumentation and electrical equipment and was selected to monitor and critique the Instrumentation and Electrical (I&E) Program at Three Mile Island Unit 2.
Over the last four years, the Technical Evaluation Group met periodically to review progress of the TMI-2 I&E program and to give guidance for further investigations to provide the greatest return to the nuclear industry.
The TMI-2 lIE Program has accomplished its program objectives and has disbanded.
Thanks are given to the experts who volunteered to participate on the Technical Evaluation Group and their respective organizations and to the principal investigators who did the work and authored the technical reports.
• The accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) provided an opportunity to evaluate a variety of instrumentation and electrical equipment for the effects of exposure to moderately severe accident conditions including steam, spray, radiation, hydrogen burn, and the resultant overpressure. The examination of this equipment over a period of severa 1 yt~ars also provi ded i nfonnati on on long-tenn exposure to moi sture. The TMI -2 Instrumentati on and El ectri ca 1 (I&E) Program ,'esul ts support the general conclusion that the plant instrumentation and electrical equipment perfor-med well with respect to its required function under the accident conditions.
The TMI-2 I&E Program also identified an~ analyzed a number of installation problems and instrument response characteristics that led to misleading information and equipment failures. These problems included farJl ty seal sand inadequate drai ns and vents to protel:t enclosed equipment against moisture, anomalous response of radiation monitors, and substantial corrosion of electrical contacts over a period of a few years. The equipment involved included the radiation monitors from which it has not been possible to determine the true radiation profile within the Reactor Building; pressure transmitters which failed due to moisture intrusion; the loose parts monitors which degraded and then failed due to the sensitivity of the electronics to radiation; various switches 3nd contacts which are continuing to fail due to corrosion; solenoid operators for valves which trapped moisture within the assE~mbly; and various other devices which suffered from moi sture i ntrusiorl.
Many of the active equipment problems could have been prevented throJgh design and installatiun practices that would have prevented moisture intrusion. The response of the radiation monitors could have been improved through improved designs and testing. The corrosion problems observed over the course of the program may represent another form of aging of electrical equipment. The means to accelerate these phenomenon for test purposes are not presently well known. The best approach is to specify designs which prevent moisture intrusion.
The Electrical Circuit Charactl~rization and Diagnostic (ECCAD) system developed by the TMI-2 I&E Program as a research tool was shown ~o have general applications for diagnosis of electrical circuits. Applications include the detection of moisture, surface conduction and contact corrosion problems, some types of cable damage, and the verification of correct circuit terminations. This system provides an integrated application of fundamental measurements and techniques developed by aerospace research to detect electrical circuit degradation. This system is currently being evaluated in a joint program with the Duke Power Company to determine its feasibility to support electrical maintenance as a diagnostics instrument. The system is, however, one of several techniques presently available. The results of the TMI-2 R&D in this regard should net be construed as a recommendation to require ECCAD monitoring as part of operating plant surveillance programs.
APPLICATIONS ENGINEERING AND EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION
The examination of damaged equipment removed from the reactor building at TMI-2 revealed a large number of problems that could only be attributed to inadequately specifying the equipment for the actual application. This was evident in moisture intrusion through equipment interface paths, energy dependence of the reactor building dome radiation monitor response, effects of field cable length on area radiation monitor indicators, and the failure of radiation sensitive semiconductors. These problems, described below, can bE directly related to inadequate applications engineering and the failure of specifications to define what was required or expected of the equipment. They are discu~sed to illustrate aspects of applications engineering and equipment specification that need attention.
TMI-2 was not unique in its specification or installation practices and the observed problems can happen during normal power plant operations. The TMI-2 accident demonstrated that while most of the equipment satisfied its design intent, there were numerous cases of equipment being damaged or degraded, long after the accident was terminated, by moisture or accumulated radiation. These conditions, along with the thermal stress, are not unusual for a nuclear power plant and can be adequately dealt with if they are specified as part of the equipment application.
Examples of Inadequacies o
Pressure Transmitters l -4
Seven pressure transmitters, of 58 available, were removed from the TMI-2 Reactor Building for evaluation at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). Of the seven transmitters, three were made by Manufacturer A and four by Manufacturer B. All of the A units survived the accident and post accident. One of the B units survived the accident and post accident, and another B unit survived the accident and one year of post accident before failing. All seven transmitters were removed fr'om locations above flood level and were exposed to approximately the same environment.
o
During the course of the evaluation of the effects of the accident on the instrumentation it became evident that many of the observed failures resulted from improper specifications of equi~ment.
All failures were attributed to moisture intrusion into the electronic component volume resulting in failure of electronic components. Those units that survived had either an adquate internal seal (Manufacturer A) or a properly installed conduit and junction box (one of Manufacturer B's transmitters). A proper performance or installation specification calling for either sealing the transmitter or for a junction box with breather, drain, and correct conduit entry would have precluded moisture intrusion.
The fact that one of the unsealed B units survived the accident and operated for a full year thereafter,l meeting or exceeding most current nuclear plant requirements, reinforces the importance of the interface specification in assuring the performance of an otherwise reliable instrument.
Dome MonitorS
The reactor building dome radiation monitor, with shielded ion chambers and electronics, was the only radiation monitor inside the Reactor Building with the ~equ'ired capability to measure and indicate LOCA-level radiation. This monitor was the subject of extensive examination in efforts to understand the monitor response and to determine radiation levels ins'ide the Reactor Building during the accident.
The dome monitor design indicated that little consideration had been given the fact that the energy content of the accident radiation changes with time during the course of an accident. By not requiring a flat gamma energy response, as evidenced by using a lead shield around the ion chamber, radiat'ion measurement inaccuracies were assured. Also, the electronics (specifically the MOS transistors) were significantly degraded by radiation exposure, suggesting that the o specification did not require qualification to accident radiation dose levels. Analysis of post-accident radiation energy as a function of time, and testing the dome monitor design for post-accident radiation dose levels, could have led to a proper specification for this equipment.
The dome monitor also appeared to have experienced moisture intrusion. The major cause was an installation error that provided a path for moisture intrusion. This may have masked a potential design problem, in that the examination results indicated that the main seal, a large-circumference o-ring, may have also leaked. Circuit analysis and testing indicated that the electronic design was sensitive to moisture in a manner that could significantly alter the indicated radiation level. A s~~cification that required equipment performance to be proven under predicted accident environmental conditions might have resulted in correction of these failure mechanisms.
Area Radiation Monitors 6 -9
Three radiation monitors were selected for early removal in an attempt to establish an improved knowledge of radiation levels during the accident. All three were located in the Reactor Building and were exposed to the accident and post-accident environment. All three monitors were of the Geiger-Mueller (GM) tube type, with an accompanying electronics package which fed square waves (one for each GM pulse) to an electronics package mounted outside the Reactor Building.
The three monitors failed bE~tween one day and 218 days following the start of the accident. This is not particularly surprising since such devices were not intended to function during or after an accident. However, these monitors provide examples of insufficient consideration of the effects of failure, 81 potential lack of testing for all functions, and the effects of field cable on equipment response that could provide misleading information.
One failure caused an erroneous (low) indication of the high radiation levels. It was discovered that the area radiation monitor functioned so that high (above scale) radiation levels could result in on-scale readings. The design did have a circuit that was supposed to keep the output above scale for high input radiation levels and it is assumed that the specification correctly required such a feature. However, in the presence of the accident radiation (estimated to be between 2.5 x 10 5 Rads and 1 x 10 6 Rads), the circuit did not work. Failure to require proof of performance at high radiation levels resul~ed in misleading information that could have hampered accident mitigation activities.
A contributor to the incorrect indication of off-scale radiation levels was found to be the length of signal cable between the GM tube electronics package and the electronics outside of the Reactor Building. The cable length was not a factor as the counting rate for the low level radiation; but, at the higher count rates, the cable length distorted the electrical signal, and this gave the appearance of a low level radiation signal. It is not clear whether the installed cable lengths were in excess of specification or whether the specification was deficient.
It should be noted that the three radiation monitors removed for examination experienced failures by three separate mechanisms, unrelated to each other and to the above problem. One failure was due to a cracked GM tube, caused by the overpressure that occurred during the hydrogen burn. The second was due to moisture intrusion caused by incorrect installation. The thill'd unit failed at 218 days after the accident due to GM quench gas depletion and could be considered an expected, age-related failure. In the third case, the unit was not in use during the accident but was energized three months later and worked for five months before failing.
11 o Loose Parts Monitor Charge Converters '
Charge converters associated with the loose parts monitoring system were found to have failed due to radiation sensitivity of CMOS semiconductors. This failure occurred in the first few days of the 6 accident when the system was being monitored very closely to detect loose parts moving through the systems and to assess core damage. This type of failure would mask or distort real loose part signals.
The studies at TMI-2 led to the determination that similar failures were occuring during nornlal operating conditions at another operating nuclear plant. This problem was subsequently corrected through redesign by the manufacturer.
The spe~lfication of a required radiation operating level and total radiation dose for this equipment could have led to the use of an alternate design or installation in a 10cation with a lower radiation environment.
o Solenoid Valves
Two Class l-E solenoid valves were removed from the Reactor Building air cooling and purge system. Both solenoids were operational except that one limit switch failed to respond to the valve position. One valve shell was rusted from moisture that had entered the solenoid housing, due to a flaw in the configuration of the conduit installation. The limit switch failure was moisture related and the lead wire insulation to both valves had embritt1ed.
The long-term integrity of these valves could have been improved by assuring protection against moisture intrusion as well as by specifying that all insulation materials be selected for resistance to radiation and thermal aging. Currently there is a wealth of information available on radiation effects on organic materials.* *M. B. Bruce, M. V. Davis, "Radiation Effects on Organic Materials in Nuclear Plants" EPRI NP-2129, November 1981.
Applications Engineering
The TMI-2 I&E Program demonstrated that both safety and non-safety-related instrument and control devices can be affected by adverse environments, and that many of these problems could have been avoided through applications engineering and more appropriate specifications, with only minor design changes being necessary. For this reason the authors suggest the following general guidelines for applications engineering.
Proper and complete applications engineering includes a detailed understanding of the function(s) of the system(s) in which the device is to operate and the function(s) of the device in the system(s) for each state of the plant, including the effects of device failure. This analysis should include considering the effects of failure for plant states where there is no required function in order to assure that the functioning of other equipment is not affected and that operating or technical support personnel are not misled wit.h incorrect information.
Once equipment functions are defined and understood with respect to operating requirements, performance requirements for each plant state can be determined. The expected environments for each of the plant states during which the devices must function (or not fail) should also be determined. These "environments" are not limited to just temperature, pressure, humidity (or steam), submersion (flooding), radiation, and vibration (both operational and seismic). They should also inciude the range and characteristics of the power source (including expected transients) and the characteristics of supporting services such as instrument air, cooling water, lubrication (allow~ble contamination levels, moisture), calibration, and preventive mdintenance. These are often overlooked details of applications engineering that affect both equipment re 1; ab; 1 i ty and the i nterpretat; Ol'l of i nformat; on recei ved, as demonstrated at TMI-2.
SUlne basic guidelines to minimize moisture related problems in a nuclear power plant are as follows: Applications engineering is essential for the equipment with safety functions, but need not he limited to such equipment. Economic consider6tions will often also justify this analysis for non-safety equipment needed for operation and management of the plant.
Specifications
Applications engineering should lead to a complete set of formal specifications which incorporate the above considerations. These specifications would provide a bclsis for procurement, installation, inspection, and testing to assurE~ that the intended perfo~nance is obtained and maintained.
For equipment with safety functions, the specifications should include the requirement that the equipment be environmentally and seismically qualified. 12 ,13 Qualification testing wi~l not replace adequate applications engineering, but will confirm the adequacy of the equipmerrt to meet the specifications. If the applications engineering is not done correctly, the testing may only confirm equipment capability to perform to an inadequate specification.
INSTALLATION AND TESTING
A number of TMI-2 equipment failures were caused by improper installation practices, which could have occurred during initial installation or during periodic equipment testing when the equipment is replaced. Problems of this type are generally associated with maintenance and can occur even with the best applications engineering and equipment specification.
NRC Staff studies 14 show that, since 1975, 35% of the nUClear power plant abnormal occurrences are directly related to maintenance activities. These studies rely heavily on the Licensee Event Reports (LER's) which include such problems (also observed at TMI-2) as connectors installed incorrectly and equipment installed backwards. The LER's do not generally identify the problem of moisture intrusion, as observed at TMI-2, as being a serious problem. The moisture problems identified at TMI-2 were primarily due to faulty seals and inadequate drains and vents. Problems of this type can remain undetected during normal plant conditions, yet may lead to early failure during abnormal conditions or accidents. They may also lead to accelerated aging of some equipment due to long-term exposure to moisture, condensation, and contaminants.
Installation and testing is addressed as a separate section in this report to emphasize its import~ncl~ and to point out its relationship to the normal plant function of maintenance and surveillance. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has documented 14 the steps being taken by the nuclear industry to enhance maintenance and surveillance.
The TMI-2 I&E Program findings indicate that the installation of moisture barriers should receive additional attention during design and construction. For existing nuclear plants, it is important that control of moisture be a signficant part of the maintenance program. In addition. electrical circuit testing methods developed by the TMI-2 I&E Program appear to be of significant value in detecting moisture and related circuit degradation problems before the plant is operationally affected.
Install ati on
At TMI-2, the installed configuration of some equipment clearly played a major part in their failure under accident conditions. In some cases, these problems resulted ill failures during the first twenty-four hours after the accident.
Examples of these problems include pressure and level transmitters,1-3 where faulty seals and improper placement of (or failure to install) drains and breathers allowed moisture to collect and damage the device internals. The failure of a radiation detector 7 was primarily attributed to the improper orientation of the detector housing, allowing moisture to collect in the connector backshell. The connector itself was improperly assembled. The reactor building dome radiation monitorS had ineffective seals, allowing moisture into the electronic circuitry and degrading instrument perfonmance. Cable or conductor penetrations at electrical devices lS ,16 were particularly susceptible to moisture intrusion.
These findings demonstrate that even simple installation requirements, if incorrectly perfonmed, can degrade the ability of the equipment to function as designed. Particular care should be taken with conduit and junction box seals, drains and vents, and the sealing of connector backshells to protect against moisture intrusion. Design practices should take into account those field activities that are critical so that installation problems are minimi2:ed. Installation practices should be controlled to assure they do not degrade the equipment design and application engineering requirements. Testing TMI-2 was a relatively new p"lant at the time of the accident, providing little information about relationships between testing practices and equipment performance. It was noted that it was necessary to remove the dome monitor during containment leak-rate testing 5 • This removal required opening the sealed container with the risk of damage to the moni tor seal and connectors. Many other components are simn arly affected during the containment leak-rate tests. Considering the statistical data relating that 35~ of the abnormal plant occurrences are maintenance related, it is an obviously prudent measure to minimize maintenance related activities. In a case such as th'is, specifying and procuring equipment able to withstand other plant tests without modification or removal should improve equipment reliability. Likewise, designing tests to maximize data for mai ntenance deci si ons whil e m' j nimi zi ng the di sturbance of equi pment seals will improve equipment reliability.
The Electrical Characteristic and Diagnostic (ECCAD) system developed as part of the TMI-2 I&E Program demonstrated that it is practical to monitor electrical circuits for information that is indicative of various types of degradation. Using the basic characteristics of resistance and impedance, combined with dissipation factor and circuit resonant frequency, it is possible to identify and describe degradation effects with good accuracy. When supplemented with time domain reflectometry (TOR) information, these techniques provide a valuable tool for analyzing circuit conditions, locating problem areas, and predicting the condition of electrical equipment.
Moisture and related degradation, including shunt resistance and poor or open connections, were detected in many circuits over the course of the program.
OPERATIONS AND ~~INTENANCE
The dominant failure mode of TMI-2 instrument and electrical equipment was due to corrosion. Water and vapor intrusion into the equipment housings caused erratic readings and ultimate failure. Where a reliable seal existed at the cable entry into the I&E equipment housing, the internals were generally not corroded and the instrument or electrical equipment was operable (if not always within specification). The TMI-2 I&E Program results cover a period of several years, providing information about the reliability of different installations and the time required for the corrosion process to degrade eqUipment to the point of failure. The observed degradation and failures over this period and the mechanisms that allow moisture and vapor intrusion have generic operating and maintenance implications.
Findings
The major cause for I&E equipment failure was moisture intrusion, as shown for several different instruments listed in Table 1 . The major mechanism for moisture intrusion was faulty or inadequate seals on conduits, fittings, housings, and connectors. The TMI-2 post-accident environment was more moist than normal plant conditions, but the number of paths for moisture intrusion, the number of instrument failures, and the extent of corrosion found have generic implications for long-term equipment operability and maintenance practices at operating plants.
These findings are reinforced by the fact that TMI-2 had just begun power operation. Seals had not undergone any significant aging, and there was limited human activity regarding disassembly of connectors or potential damage to conduit, connectors, or housing seals. In operating plants, routine maintenance activities will repeatedly disturb and challenge these seals. .)
The following maintenance precautions should be used to ensure the integrity of I&E equipment seals:
Maintenance and test procedures should contain specific requirements regardin~J care and installation of conduits, seals, and connector's.
2. After maintenance, where possible, seals should be tested or otherwise verified intact.
3. Connectors should be verified properly as made-up and intact to accomplish their sealing function.
4.
I&E equipment that exhibits anomalous behavior should be investigated for moisture instrusion. Anomolous behavior includes erratic operation, drift, or too-frequent calibrations.
5. Containment close-out checklists should include checks of I&E equipment for obvious damage to conduits, seals, and connectors. These checks should be done after all work in the general area is completed.
Predictive Maintenance 17 -l9
The Electrical Circuit Characterization and Diagnostic (ECCAD) system developed under the TMI-2 I&E Program, provides an additional means for diagnostics and predictive maintenance for electrical circuits. This system integrates time domain reflectometry with standard impedance measurements in a computer-based measurement system. ECCAD measurements successfully identified a variety of moisture and corrosion problems in TMI-2 electrical circuits from outside the Reactor Building and with minimum disturbance of circuit terminations.
ECCAD data can be compared to electrical standards and criteria for circuit operation. The presence, and often the location, of moisture intrusion can be determined, evaluated, and monitored with respect to the effect on circuit function and the need for corrective maintenance of conduit, connector, or housing seals. ECCAD signatures also provide a means to verify remotely that cable terminations have been properly restored following other maintenance and testing activities. These measurements can be performed remotely, efficiently, and with computer-based data management.
Additional information on the ECCAD system is provided in Appendix A. The Electrical Circuit Characterization and Diagnostic (ECCAD) System is a computer-controlled measurement system designed to characterize electrical circuits in nuclear power plants. EG&G Idaho, Inc., developed the system at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy in order to assess the damage to electrical circuits caused by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2). The system has been demonstrated to enhance maintenance activities by diagnosing problems in electrical circuits and can provide a data base for trending electrical circuit conditions. The ECCAD System characterizes the electrical parameters that might impact the ability of a circuit to perform its electrical function. For example, if the circuit is a motor for a motor-operated valve, the ECCAD System will determine if all connections or contacts are good, if proper voltage can be applied to operate the motor, and if the motor is electrically functional. In order to apply the ECCAD System, the circuit must be interrupted at some point to disconnect electrical leads and connect a lead from the measurement system. The ECCAD System has a built-in capability to check internal calibration prior to each measurement and to confirm that the circuit is returned to its original condition after testing is completed. In application at Shippingport for the NRC Nuclear Plant Aging Research program, 234 circuits were tested over a period of two weeks. In a similar application for Southern California Edison at San Onofre Unit 1, circuits were tested over a period of seven weeks.
17

Application at TMI-2
The ECCAD System has been used at TMI-2 for two years. More than 750 circuits have been tested. The first circuits were tested in late 1982 in order to determine if decontamination activities would compound the effects of the accident. Analysts examining approximately 50 circuits determined that water sprayed during decontamination work was not making the circuits wetter; rather. the circuits appeared to be drying out. Testing continued in 1983 and in an effort to screen a large number of circuits at a low cost in order to select the best candidates for removal and examination. At the present. a number of circuits ilave been tested three times, at one-year intervals.
Description of Electrical Equipment
The ECCAD System is composed of electronic test equipment that is readily available on the commercial market ( Figure A-l) . The system is controlled by a Compaq Personal Computer. The computer controls the individual instruments, setting critical factors. It performs a self-test on the systems, and it sequences the instruments. It also formats the data. ensuring a standard data set of high quality and eliminating much of the operator uncertainty that often plagues long-term (trending) data acquisition.
The ECCAD System makes six basic electrical tests (measurements) and records the data digitally using the test and recording equipment listed in Table A 
